The prospects for the U.S. economy have become uniquely dreadful, if not frightening. In this paper we argue, as starkly as we can, that the United States and the rest of the world's economies will not be able to achieve balanced growth and full employment unless they are able to agree and implement an entirely new way of running the global economy. Yet we should admit up front that while we feel able to outline the nature and magnitude of the emerging crisis, and even to set down some of the things that must happen, we have few solid suggestions as to how these changes can now be brought about.
1 published in 1999, at a time when there was an emphatic consensus that "the good times were here to stay," we took the contrarian view-well ahead of the curve-that unsustainable imbalances were building up that would eventually require both a large fiscal stimulus and a sustained rise in net exports, preferably via a substantial depreciation of the dollar.
The first part of this diagnosis was validated de facto by the huge relaxation in fiscal policy in 2001-03, probably amounting to some $700 billion, which unintentionally (i.e., not as part of any strategic plan) staved off the worst of the recession that took place at that time as a result 2 Strategic Analysis, December 2008 of the dot-com crash. This stimulus, in our view very properly, put the budget permanently into deficit, obliterating the surplus of which the Clinton Administration had been so proud.
The balance of payments (which had been zero in 1992) then moved even further into deficit, on a scale never seen before, reaching over 6 percent of GDP in 2006. Despite the growing subtraction from aggregate demand as a result of this adverse trend, the U.S. economy continued to grow at a satisfactory rate because the balance of payments deficit was offset by a large and growing fall in personal net saving that was fed by a renewed rise in net lending to the private sector, the counterpart to the disgraceful boom in subprime and other lending.
It should again have been obvious that these trends could not continue for long. As early as
2004, in a Strategic Analysis subtitled Why Net Exports Must Now Be the Motor for U.S.

Growth,
2 we argued that continued growth in net lending to the private sector was an impossibility, and that at some stage there would have to be a collapse both in lending and in private expenditure relative to income. It would not be possible to save the situation by applying another fiscal stimulus as in 2001, because that would increase the budget deficit to about 8 percent of GDP, implying that the public debt would then be hurtling toward 100 percent of GDP, with more to come. As these processes were nevertheless allowed to continue, we perforce had to bring the short-term prospect into sharper focus. As the turnaround in net lending eventually became manifest, we predicted in our November 2007 Analysis 3 -without being too precise about timing-that, as a result, there would be a recession in 2008. At that time we entertained the possibility that, with the dollar so low, net exports might save the day, after an uncomfortable period of recession.
The processes by which U.S. output was sustained through the long period of growing imbalances could not have occurred if China and other Asian countries had not run huge current account surpluses, with an accompanying "saving glut" and a growing accumulation of foreign exchange reserves that prevented their exchange rates from falling enough, flooding U.S. financial markets with dollars and thereby helping to finance the lending boom. Some economists have gone so far as to suggest that the growing imbalance problem was entirely the consequence of the saving glut in Asian and other surplus countries. In our view, there was an interdependent process in which all parties played an active role. The United States could not have maintained growth unless it had been happy to sponsor, or at least permit,
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private sector (particularly personal sector) borrowing on such an unprecedented scale.
Changes in the three financial balances-government, foreign, and private-which illustrate the major forces driving the U.S. economy (and the use of which has been central to all our work), are shown in Figure 1 . 4 The figure also shows the level of GDP relative to trend, here taken to be actual output in excess of what it would have been with 6 percent unemployment. For easy comparison, Figure 1 also illustrates the "base run" on which our projections are founded. These are discussed in the following section.
The Recession, 2007-?
To get a sense of the effect of private indebtedness on private net saving it is useful to look first at the level of private debt expressed as a proportion of GDP since 1980, illustrated in lending is rather surprising at first, for there is nothing in the line just above to prepare one for it. It is perfectly comprehensible (and logically inevitable) nevertheless. Net lending is made up of two components: repayments plus interest, which will be a relatively stable proportion of the stock of debt; and receipts in the form of new loans, which may be highly volatile and which must have been falling extremely sharply through 2008 as the credit crunch took its toll.
It is important to recognize that there is no natural floor to the flow of net lending as it reaches zero; indeed, we are expecting gross lending to continue falling below repayments (causing negative lending) for a considerable time.
As Figure 2 shows, we have assumed (heroically) that over the next five years the level of private debt relative to GDP will fall back to about 130 percent of GDP-roughly the level at which it had stabilized before 2000.
The implication of these assumptions is that net lending to the private sector falls by about 14 percent of GDP between the first quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009-a drop that has already largely occurred-and that net lending continues negative for a long time after that.
In our view, the unprecedented drop in interest rates recently engineered by the Federal
Reserve may not be effective in reactivating standard lending practices, unless confidence in future profits and income growth is restored. However, low interest rates will keep mortgage payments low, sustaining disposable income and helping the economy to recover.
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Implication for Future Private Spending, GDP, and the Other Sector Balances
The final four years illustrated in Figure 1 trace our baseline projection for the government deficit based on neutral assumptions regarding government expenditure and tax receipts. But it is the dramatic fall in net lending to the private sector on which our projected steep fall in both the private sector balance and GDP over the next few years crucially depends. The balance of trade follows by identity, though there are legitimate grounds for supposing it to be plausible; according to our projection, it improves quite a lot, mainly as a result of the collapse in U.S. GDP. The projection for exports is consistent with that published by the International
Monetary Fund, and we allow the model to generate figures for imports. The Appendix below describes the equation in our model that relates private expenditure to disposable income, net lending, and capital gains. This equation-which, with hardly any change, has served us well since 1999-finds the "long term" marginal impact of real expenditure with respect to (real) net lending to be about 0.48.
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As illustrated in the extreme right-hand section of Figure 1 , the implication of all these assumptions, taken together, is that GDP will fall about 12 percent below trend between now
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and 2010, while unemployment will rise to about 10 percent. It is a central contention of this report that the virtual collapse of private spending will make it impossible for U.S. authorities to apply a fiscal and monetary stimulus large enough to return output and unemployment to tolerable levels within the next two years. In support of this contention, we show in Figures 3 and 4 alternative projections for the main financial balances, output, and unemployment, based on the assumption that fiscal stimuli are immediately applied equal to an increase in government outlays of about $380 billion, or 2.6 percent of GDP (Shock 1), and in the extreme case, $760 billion, or 5.3 percent of GDP (Shock 2).
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The implication of these projections is that, even with the application of almost unbelievably large fiscal stimuli, output will not increase enough to prevent unemployment from continuing to rise through the next two years.
Fiscal Policy in a Single Country Will Not Eliminate the Imbalances
It seems to us unlikely that U.S. budget deficits on the order of 8-10 percent through the next two years could be tolerated for purely political reasons, given the strong and widespread
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belief that the budget should normally be balanced. But looking at the matter more rationally, we are bound to accept that nothing like the configuration of balances and other variables displayed in Figures 3 and 4 could possibly be sustained over any long period of time. The budget deficits imply that the public debt relative to GDP would rise permanently to about 80 percent, while GDP would remain below trend, with unemployment above 6 percent.
Fiscal policy alone cannot, therefore, resolve the current crisis. A large enough stimulus will help counter the drop in private expenditure, reducing unemployment, but it will bring back a large and growing external imbalance, which will keep world growth on an unsustainable path.
Need for Concerted Action
Our baseline scenario may be considered as a rather extreme case, where lending to households and firms is not restored for a considerable amount of time. If confidence is restored in financial markets and lending returns to normal, prebubble levels, private expenditure will increase, helping the economy to recover. In this case, the private sector balance will slowly be restored to its prebubble level, with a slower reduction in the debt-toincome ratio, and the government deficit will drop as a result of increased tax revenues. In this case, again, the balance of payments will start to deteriorate again, unless countermeasures are taken.
At the moment, the recovery plans under consideration by the United States and many other countries seem to be concentrated on the possibility of using expansionary fiscal and monetary policies.
But, however well coordinated, this approach will not be sufficient.
What must come to pass, perhaps obviously, is a worldwide recovery of output, combined with sustainable balances in international trade.
Since this series of reports began in 1999, we have emphasized that, in the United States, sustained growth with full employment would eventually require both fiscal expansion and a rapid acceleration in net export demand. Part of the needed fiscal stimulus has already occurred, and much more (it seems) is immediately in prospect. But the U.S. balance of payments languishes, and a substantial and spontaneous recovery is now highly unlikely in
Levy Economics Institute 9
view of the developing severe downturn in world trade and output. Nine years ago, it seemed possible that a dollar devaluation of 25 percent would do the trick. But a significantly larger adjustment is needed now. By our reckoning (which is put forward with great diffidence), if the United States now attempts to restore full employment by fiscal and monetary means alone, the balance of payments deficit will rise over the next, say, three to four years to 6 percent of GDP or more-that is, to a level that could not possibly be sustained for a long period, let alone indefinitely. Yet, for trade to begin expanding sufficiently would require exports to grow faster than we are at present expecting, implying that in three to four years the level of exports would be 25 percent higher than it would have been with no adjustment.
It is inconceivable that such a large rebalancing could occur without a drastic change in the institutions responsible for running the world economy-a change that would involve placing far less than total reliance on market forces. where HB is real household borrowing; BB, real business borrowing; and PFA, the relative price of equities. The equation is estimated with two-stage least squares and is robust to the standard battery of specification tests.
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Notes 1 Godley (1999) . 2 Godley, Izurieta, and Zezza (2004) . 3 Godley et al. (2007) . 4 In the top of Figure 1 we plot the balances of the private, government, and foreign sectors, which are derived from the well-known accounting identity I = S + G -T + BP, where I is private sector investment, S is private sector saving, G is government expenditure, and BP is the current account of the balance of payments. Defining the government deficit as GD = G -T and the private sector balance as IS = I -S and rearranging, we get IS = GD + BP, which are the three lines in Figure 1 , scaled by GDP. A positive value for any of this balance implies that the sector, net contribution to aggregate demand, is positive. The output gap measure shown in the lower part of Figure 1 is obtained by our estimate of the difference between real GDP and the level of real GDP that implies a stable level of unemployment. 5 The marginal propensity to spend out of household borrowing is 0.47, while the marginal propensity to spend out of business borrowing is 0.37. See Appendix for details. 6 We assume the stimulus to be evenly split between increases in government current and capital expenditure, and increases in government net transfers to the private sector.
